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Differentiating Church and State (Without Losing the Church)

Patrick McKinley Brennan1

I. Introduction: Harvesting the Lessons of Expulsion

When it comes to libertas Ecclesiae, “the liberty of the Church,” what is at stake
came tumbling home to me in a flash one morning, in 2005, as I stood high in a remote
mountain range in the south of France. Someone once said that there is nothing like a
gallows to focus a man’s mind: For me there was nothing like seeing how, in 1903,
soldiers enforcing the legislative will of the French Third Republic marched monks from
their home in those remote mountains, from the monastery where they and their forebears
had dwelt in silence since the year 1084. I refer to the expulsion of the Carthusian monks
from their motherhouse, La Grande Chartreuse, and thence from France itself. The
images in the pictures I saw there, in the museum just down the hill from La Grande
Chartreuse, are almost beyond belief. The caption could read: “Armed soldiers arrest
contemplatives.”2
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A statute passed in 1901 required that religious orders, if they wished to remain in
France, obtain an authorization from the government, if they could: “No religious
congregation may be formed without an authorization given by a law which shall
determine the conditions of its operation. . . . Congregations existing at the time of the
promulgation of the present law which have not been previously authorized or recognized
must prove within the space of three months that they have taken the necessary steps to
conform to its requirements.”3 The Carthusians of La Grande Chartreuse could not
obtain the required authorization, but not for any lack of trying on their part. As the New
York Times reported on March 27, 1903:

The Chamber of Deputies to-day completed the Government’s programme
regarding the male religious orders which applied for authorization to
remain in France. It refused by a large majority, the application of the
Carthusian monks. They were separated from the other orders in the
consideration of the applications as forming a class apart, they being
employed in the manufacturing of a cordial. . . . The Chamber . . ., by a
vote of 338 to 231, refused to entertain the Carthusians’ application, and
adjourned.4

Carthusian monks. A recent English language introduction to the Carthusian way is Robin Bruce Lockhart,
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Without the monks’ having enjoyed so much as a proper hearing, the soldiers were
dispatched, the monks dispersed, and their common life of cloistered prayer terminated.
The soldiers came at three o’clock in the morning while the community was singing the
Divine Office in church, and they proceeded to arrest the monks one by one.5 With that,
the unique amalgam of eremetism and cenobitism that the followers of Saint Bruno had
pursued and refined in that remote site since 1084 thus vanished again, the first time
being upon their expulsion during that press for liberty, equality, and fraternity called the
Revolution. So much for liberty for the possibility of monastic fraternity. The Church,
instantiated in the community of La Grande Chartreuse, was no longer at liberty to be
herself.

Most denials of the life and liberty of the Church are, we can suppose, less
dramatic than monks being pried out of their monasteries by armies. But it was the
consequences of that 1901 statute and the expulsion as I saw it memorialized at La
Grande Chartreuse that focused for me the nature of the problem of the liberty of the
Church. Difficult as it may be for us Americans to recognize, religious liberty is not just
about individuals and their solitary acts of free conscience, however sublime those might
be. Religion, or at least the Catholic religion, is something people do together, in
communion and in communities – or, as I shall prefer – in societies. That is, individuals
5

Though there were a few dramatic incidents, most of the religious orders whose requests for
authorizations were denied at the same time as the Carthusians’ dispersed quietly and quickly. “The most
serious incident occurred at the Grande-Chartreuse monastery. The colonel entrusted with the task of
expelling the monks gave the necessary orders and then handed in his own resignation. When the day
arrived, thousands of peasants gathered, armed with sticks. Bonfires were lighted in the mountains and the
tocsins rang out from the churches in reply to the great monastery bells. Vehicles, trees, and rocks blocked
the road. The soldiers arrived at three o’clock in the morning and the sappers had to use axes on the doors.
The fathers, who were singing office in the chapel, were arrested one by one while the crowd intoned the
words of Parce Domine.” Adrien Dansette, Religious History of Modern France (Hew York: Herder and
Herder, 1961), vol. II. 201-02.

3

practice the Catholic religion in part through associating with one another, and instances
of associating take on almost every conceivable size and shape. Examples include the
Church universal, the parish, the sodality, the college, the order, the institute, the convent,
the monastery – and yes, even La Grande Chartreuse.6

None of the aforementioned ecclesial societies exists in splendid isolation, of
course. They exist in a complex web of dynamically overlapping and interlocking fleshand-blood Venn diagrams of other ecclesial societies, and these in turn interface with and
overlap the garden variety facets of non-ecclesial communal human life such as cities,
counties, villages, families, clubs, unions, and so forth. The varied rubbings-up-against
and crossings-over among all these associational forces are beyond numbering. Not
always frictionless, they are among the reasons that leaders and aspiring leaders seek to
make their mark by tidying things up. So-called sovereigns and bureaucrats alike delight
to get lines of jurisdiction laid down and delimited. And from the project of clarifying it
is an easy and almost natural next step -- if it has not already been taken -- to start to
usurp.

The expulsion of the community of La Grande Chartreuse may be especially
clarifying, after the manner of a gallows, exactly because of the ways in which it was
perhaps, if you will, something approaching the pure case. Ejecting Jesuits is one thing;
they’re always meddling, rousing the rabble, and generally causing trouble, and not just
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for Jansenists.7 In the case of the Carthusians of La Grande Chartreuse, however, these
were recluses dwelling in the obscurity of the most remote valley Saint Bruno and his
companions could find when in 1084 they went in search of solitude. Their life hardly
implicated Mill’s harm principle. Moreover, and more serious, ongoing association, in its
many manifestations, was essential, and conspicuously so, to what they were about.
Communal prayer, the celebration together of the sacraments, not to mention the joint
resolve to bear one another along in the monastic pilgrimage – in a word, the act of
associating (as Carthusian monks): this was not achievable in diaspora. Which is exactly
what the French government hoped.

But what could possibly justify government’s not allowing men8 to dwell together
in tranquil unity? One possible justification would be that the individuals concerned did
not have a right to practice their religion, that is, that none of them individually enjoyed a
legal right – because none of them enjoyed a natural individual subjective right -- to
practice the Catholic religion. Such a putative justification would be false by most
modern lights, including my own, but, it was not, in any event, the one which the French
government had in the collective mind when it dislodged the Carthusian community from
its cloister garth. The rationale that lay behind the particular statute in question, as well
as behind hosts of others, was articulated as follows by France’s own Jean-Jacques
Rousseau: “It is of necessity . . . that no partial society exist in a state.”9
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In holding this view, Rousseau was not eccentric. The ideal and insistent
aspiration of the lion’s share of modern political theory and its implementers has been to
liberate the individual/citizen, whether he like it or not, from his plural and particularist
associations in order to deliver him barnacle-free to that level playing-field where he and
his negative liberty would be supervised solely by the solitary sovereign. In aid and
justification of this project, it has been characteristic of modern states to claim a
monopoly over the rights of societies to exist. Societies spring up quite naturally, of
course, but the modern state frequently imagines that any right (to continue) to associate
is the result of a concession by the state.10 If, in this new world order, individuals/citizens
are allowed by right to associate in partial societies, it would be because the sovereign
has deigned to concede such a (revocable) right.11 The Third Republic declined to
concede that right to the monks of La Grande Chartreuse.

II. Jacques Maritain and Social Ontology

Even today, if in more subtle ways – as subtle as the Catholic Charities12 case, as
to which more in due course – many legitimate governments continue to usurp the liberty
of the Church. Not everyone, however, has capitulated to the theories that would justify
such usurpations. Throughout the middle third of the twentieth century, the layman
Jacques Maritain worked out and advanced a robust yet nuanced understanding and
defense of the liberty of the Church. I was asked to address the significance Jacques
10
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Maritain’s thought for the question of libertas Ecclesiae, and I am happy to do so because
I believe that it is worthwhile to understand and learn from Maritain on this topic as on
every other one on which he wrote or spoke.13 Maritain lived through the expulsion not
just of the Carthusians but of many religious orders from his native France; he also lived
through the closing of thousands of Catholic schools as a consequence of the 1901 Law
of Associations.14 These usurpations of the liberty of the Church, moreover, were just
one facet of the totalitarianisms with which he became involuntarily familiar before
fleeing France, in 1941, for the comparative safety of the United States. Maritain thought
hard about the sort of self-aggrandizing, usurping statecraft that predictably, and proudly,
mutates into totalitarianism.

It is altogether too easy to forget what Maritain, if we would listen, reminds us of.
People today, except when they accede to the temptation to imagine full-swing
“globalization” and correlative “world government,” tend to take the modern nation state,
with its pretensions to “sovereignty,” for granted, indeed a cause for celebration. And,
starting from a hypertrophied concept of the state, people run aground and amok when
they turn their attention -- if they do turn their attention -- to the Church and her liberty.
Maritain, by contrast, takes neither concept – church or state -- too easily. Maritain’s
precision about what it means to be Church and what it means to be a “state” both
clarifies the debate and, by doing so, raises the stakes of judgment. Too liberal for
13
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conservatives and too conservative for liberals, Maritain offers all-comers ample food for
thought. Maritain’s work merits study for its intrinsic value, especially, in this context,
his clarity about what is usually discussed under the confused and generally confusing
label “subsidiarity.”

To this we can can add that Maritain’s understanding of the differentiation of
Church and state is, approximately, the one on which the Church settled at the Second
Vatican Council. This was long in the making. Eugenio Pacelli, the future Pope Pius XII
(r. 1939-1958), read Maritain and, as is well known, Giovanni Montini, the future Pope
Paul VI (r. 1963-1978), not only read Maritain but translated his work and even
considered him his mentor and, quite remarkably, cited him by name in an encyclical.
Without prejudice to the role of Fr. John Courtney Murray, S.J., in the Church’s
recognizing and declaring the right to religious liberty, we can observe that it is
something close to the layman Maritain’s social ontology that one discerns in modern
magisterial teachings on Church and state. In the words of the Second Vatican Council’s
Declaration on Religious Liberty, Dignitatis humanae:

The freedom of the Church (libertas ecclesiae) is the fundamental
principle in what concerns the relations between the Chuch and
governments and the whole civil order (totumque ordinem civilem). . . .
The Church . . . claims for herself in her character as a society of men who
have the right (qui iure gaudent) to live in society in accordance with the

8

principles of the Christian faith. . . . This independence is precisely what
the authorities of the Church claim in society.15

The principal point I should like to develop here is this: Maritain’s -- and the
Church’s -- account is emphaticially one of a social ontology, that is, an ontology of
social forms. On Maritain’s -- and the Magisterium’s -- view, the starting point for a
solution to any perceived “problem” of Church and state and, above all, for an accurate
statement of the liberty of the Church, is to recover an ontology of plural social forms
that are, at least in potency, given, either by nature (e.g., the family) or supernature (the
Church). The central thesis is that what is to be family or Church or body politic does not
await invention, although it may await instantiation or re-instantiation, formation or reformation. In a world that respects such forms, one is not pinioned among a putatively
sovereign state and lone individuals and, perhaps, a Church (some of) whose liberty is
parceled out by the sovereign. One is instead faced with a plurality of societies, as well
as individuals, in need of respect and coordination, perhaps regulation, and sometimes
help – but never brute demolition of a thriving society, never what happened at La
Grande Chartreuse.

III. The Decision to Differentiate

15

Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, Declaration on Religious Libery, Dignitatis humanae (1965), no.

13.
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I have been referring to “the liberty of the Church,” but it is needful to recall that
what we mean by “the Church” is neither univocal nor immediately clear. There are
competing and sometimes complementary “models” of the Church. 16 Some of these
models, moreover, emerged and have been refined in the very theological and
philosophical work by which the Church differentiated herself from the political realities
with which she was historically associated and in which she was sometimes thought to be
embedded. For the better part of Christian history, “the Catholic Church was wedded to
Western society in the form of a single, though differentiated, corpus mysticum.”17 What
we refer to as the problem of “Church and state,” what was sometimes referred to as the
relationship between “throne and altar,” was long celebrated (and sometimes vilified) as
“Christendom,” a mystical organic unity of the forms of ruling authority in which God
allows humans to participate. Though indeed “differentiated” in various permutations,
there was a reliable emphasis on their unity in one organic whole.

In short, the Church came into the modern period interlaced and interlocked in all
manner of ways, both factually and conceptually, with institutions from which, in the
course of the nineteenth century, she would decide that she must decisively differentiate
herself. The result of this differentiation would be the end of “Christendom.” Exactly
how that differentiation was to take shape, is my principal concern in this paper. Before
turning to the particulars of the differentiation, however, it merits emphasis that it was the
Church’s will that differentiation occur, and this, not for the advantage of the state or of
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in Mediaeval Political Theology (1957).
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indifferentism, but above all, of course, for the Church’s own freedom and work: These
salient facts that are lost on many of our own pro-establishment contemporaries were not
always lost on our ancestors who favored the puppet national Catholic churches that a
decadent Christendom could reliably deliver. In France in 1868, for example, Emile
Ollivier declared in the Chamber of Deputies: “Undoubtedly, Gentlemen, I know that
Rome earnestly wishes to separate itself from the State, but,” Ollivier continued
presciently, “she does not want the State to separate itself from Her.”18

It is common to associate the differentiation with the revolution in France, and it
is indeed true that from at least the time of Revolution “issues of ecclesiology were
deeply interwoven in the mélange of the disputes between the Church and the” newfangled “states” that were vying for recognition. I say “at least,” however, because, as
Maritain observed in his 1927 book The Things That Are Not Caesar’s, “it was five
hundred years ago that we began to die.”19 And, it was some five-hundred years before
that that “we,” the Church, were at the peak of health, at least at a conceptual level. We
can take this in stages.

The monk Hildebrand was elected to the Chair of Peter in 1073, from which he
reigned as Pope Gregory VII until 1085, effecting what is known as the Gregorian
“reformatio.” Wishing to purify the Church and insulate her governance from lay
interference, in 1075 Gregory published Dictatus Papae, consisting of twenty-seven crisp

18

Quoted in Russell Hittinger, “Introduction to Modern Roman Catholicism,” in John Witte, Jr., and
Frank Alexander (eds.), The Teachings of Modern Roman Catholicism on Law, Politics, and Human
Nature 11 (2007).
19
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propositions addressed to himself. One proposition claimed that “he alone [the pope]
may depose and reinstate bishops,” and another that “no judgment of his may be revised
by anyone, . . . he alone may revise [the judgments] of all.”20 “This document,” Harold
Berman explains, “was revolutionary – although Gregory ultimately managed to find
some legal authority for every one of its provisions.”21

Not everyone agreed with the Pope, but the model was more than amply clear.
Gregory excommunicated Emperor Henry IV on account of his disagreement.22 (Henry,
it will be recalled, repented, standing barefoot in the snow for three days outside of the
castle of Countess Matilda of Tuscany). Thanks to the Gregorian reform, the Church
succeeded in a rather significant way in creating what has been called “a church within a
church,” such that she – in the form of religious houses (on the model of Cluny and Bec)
and religious orders (such as the Benedictines, the Camaldolese, the Cistercians, and yes,
the Carthusians) – was exempt not only from lay control but also from that of local
bishops. This internal differentiation of the Church was a mighty innovation, the
significance of which is easily lost on those of us moderns who willy-nilly fall back into
the mode of thinking that the Church is made and constituted sort of the way a bus-stop
gets populated, that is, by individuals’ showing up and continuing to hang around, or not.
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Beginning from the premise that membership in the particular society that is the Church
universal is, if you will, an ontological fact (traceable to baptism, the event of
incorporation), the Gregorian reform then went on to clarify, and protect, the other unities
of association by which the ecclesial reality was internally differentiated. There will be
more to say about this.

Meanwhile, however, the rest of the Church remained, more or less, in the debt of
those laity whose generosity to the Church had been rewarded with the ius patronatus, a
varied bundle of rights that, thanks to the Church’s delegation, could be exercised to
influence the governance of the Church, as by vetoing potential bishops. (By the way,
the Polish state vetoed seven candidates before allowing the future John Paul II to
become bishop of Krakow. Too clever by half, I’d say).23 Such rights date back as far as
the sixth century, but approaching the eleventh century, and then again approaching the
sixteenth century, when “we began to die,” those possessed of the ius patronatus were
tending to view their ius as their own jurisdiction, that is, as not a concession by the
Church. Referring to what happened in Spain in the late fifteenth century, where this
development was perhaps most notable, Russell Hittinger explains: “The key point . . . is
that Madrid did not regard the authority as delegated, but rather interpreted Roman
concessions as recognition of authority inherent in state sovereignty.”24 He continues:
“The architects of the French Revolution did not invent, but rather inherited, the principle
that the church, as a visible and temporal society, was the property of the state.”25

23
24
25

Hittinger, Dignitatis, 1042.
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As we have observed, the Church came into the nineteenth century with
Christendom as the model of choice. In its purity, the idea was that Church and state
were one body, “internally differentiated by two authorities, each of which was thought to
share in Christ’s triplex munus of priest, prophet, and king. The King participated in
Christ’s rule pedes in terra (feet on earth) while the episcopal authority imaged Christ’s
rule caput in caelo (head in heaven).”26 There were many variations on exactly how all
this was to be understood, as the research of Ernst Kantorowicz has shown in deep detail,
but the core idea remained intact. There was one body, with two authorities, and one
authority, the spiritual, was superior. “There was one a time when States were governed
by the philosophy of the Gospel,”27 wrote Pope Leo in 1885 as he looked back at a world
gone-by.

As the modern nations states grew, most of them remained de jure within the
Catholic fold, but, de facto, they grew independent wings and arrant aspirations to
sovereignty; creepingly but insistently, the national Catholic churches were subordinated
to their respective national sovereigns. For example, when the Tsar of Russia in 1812
won the right to govern the former Kingdom of Poland, Pope Gregory XVI – no
modernist, he – responded by reminding the Polish bishops (in the encyclical Cum
primum) of their duty to obey the temporal authority. Here we have the Pope telling the
Church in Poland to “abandon its self-government to a schismatic tsar.”28

26
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Hittinger, Dignitatis humanae, 1040
Encyclical Immortale Dei no. 21; discussed at Hittinger, Dignitatis humanae, 1040.
Hittinger, Introduction, 9
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Throughout the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century, as the Popes
scrambled to save face and make the best of many a bad situation, the dysfunction and
possible ways forward became the subject of serious study. Shortly before his death in
1878, Pope Pius IX expressed privately that his ways, including his stalwart insistence
that the Christendom model -- complete with Papal States, to boot -- was the only correct
model, had failed and that it was time for a new approach.29 In the course of the twentyfive year pontificate of his successor, Pope Leo XIII, there emerged the clear-sighted
judgment that “the state cannot co-govern the church.”30 The Church was to be what the
Gregorian reform of the eleventh century had sought: free to be herself. And she was to
be free in virtue of a clear differentiation of Church and state; according to Leo, “there
are on earth two principal societies, the one civil, the proximate end of which is the
temporal and worldly good of the human race; the other religious, whose office it is to
lead mankind to that true, heavenly, and everlasting happiness for which we are
created.”31 But, though many who would come later would overlook or deny the point,
Leo believed that the Church must now reach people through its direct effect on
individuals and society (rather than, as before, through the arm of the state). From now
on the Church’s temporal mission would focus on “faith embodied in the conscience of
peoples rather than restoration of medieval institutions.”32

IV. Three Elements, Not Two

29
30
31
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Leo’s first encyclical was on “the evils of society” and his second, published
within the same year, specialized in the same by condemning “socialism.” Aeterni
Patris, his third encyclical -- the programmatic one of his pontificate -- was published the
next year (1879). As is well known, Aeterni Patris summoned the faithful to look to the
works of the great scholastics and, above all, of St. Thomas Aquinas for resources both
intellectual and spiritual with which to forge remedies for the evils afflicting both
“domestic and civil society.”33

Re-enter Jacques Maritain, a man who believed that it was his personal vocation
to respond to the summons of Aeterni patris, that is, to philosophize as a Thomist. He
also, like Leo, believed that there was creative work to be done. “Thomas, after all, had
no conception of a modern state or an industrialized economy. Nor in Thomas could
there be found a ready-made doctrine of subsidiarity, justiciable natural rights, social
justice, political parties, or a lay-based democracy.”34 These were to be achievements of
neo-Thomists, and in an exemplary way, of Jacques Maritain.

When Leo’s twenty-five year pontificate ended in 1903, the Magisterium’s
development of political theology abated until the election of Achille Ratti as Pius XI in
1922. Ratti had been educated by Leo’s Thomistic colleagues in Rome, and as Pius XI
he immediately set about furthering the Leonine Thomistic project. It was during Ratti’s
formidable pontificate that Maritain first, and irrevocably, turned his attention to
statecraft and politics, recognizing that “whereas for centuries the crucial issues for

33
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religious thought were the great theological controversies centered on the dogmas of
faith, the crucial issues will now deal with political theology and political philosophy.”35
Maritain’s first foray into this area was in 1927; in English it bears the title The Things
That Are Not Caesar’s, while in French it was known as The Primacy of the Spiritual.
Together the two titles signal two points on which Maritain never fails to insist. First,
there is a jurisdiction other than Caesar’s; second, that other jurisdiction is higher.
However, the fact that the Church exercises a higher jurisdiction does not lead Maritain
to conflate Church and state or to collapse the state into the Church. It leads him, instead,
to distinguish carefully and thus to differentiate adequately. Adequate differentiation is
exactly what had not happened in the past to the extent, and that extent was large, that it
was thought and believed that the Church was married to society in the aforementioned
corpus mysticum.

Before following Maritain, we need to be clear on what exactly Maritain will be
arguing against. When the moderns confronted this mystical organic unity, they wrung
from it only individuals and a sovereign that, across a territorially bounded unit,
exercised over themselves something called “sovereignty.” Less obvious than the
dissolution of the organic unity of the overall corpus mysticum is the correlative modern
judgment that the only unity individuals can achieve is to be achieved extrinsically, that
is, “by contracts, by the serendipitous outcomes of a market, or, more ominously, by the
external application of law as the superior force of the state.”36 The characteristic

35
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modern move is to deny the possibility of intrinsic unity (other than of individual
substances).

The modern model allows exactly two fundamental elements: individuals and
their sovereign, the latter of which frequently is referred to as “the state.” Not only are
there no supernaturally given intrinsic social unities, such as the Church, there are not
even any naturally given intrinsic social unities, such as the family. If you think this is
fanciful, consider this bald assertion by Yale Law professor Robert Post: “There is no
‘natural’ social order . . . ”37 – and, though Post of course does not trouble himself to
deny it, no “supernatural” social order either. With no intrinsic social unities given, it is
an easy next step to suppose that unities need not be allowed. On the modern view, if
individuals enjoy a right to associate, they do so simply thanks to the sovereign state’s
concession of a right to exist, a right extrinsically to associate.

Re-enter Maritain again. Differentiating the corpus mysticum, Maritain finds
individuals, alright, but individuals who are, by nature, social – individuals, that is, each
of whom is a unity and individuals who are, either in fact or in potency, participants in
the intrinsic unities of marriage, family, church, and the body politic. Against the view
that any unity is extrinsic, Maritain counters that there are intrinsic unities, that there is
“an ontological landscape to social forms.”38 Though they certainly require our free and
constructive contribution (they are not the product of autogenesis such that human
freedom is pro tanto canceled), these come from nature, our nature; they are, as Maritain
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says in a phrase I find memorable, “rough-hewn by nature.”39 The exception to what I
just wrote is “the Church;” though the realizing of her essence also requires the
contribution of human agency, her form comes not from nature, but from God. All of
these given intrinsic unities, both natural and supernatural, deserve to be treated as what
they are, not as mere extrinsic aggregations.

So far, then, there are two fundamental elements to reckon with: individuals and
societies. There is, though, a third element, and we can discover it by following Maritain
in a distinction to which I have not yet called attention, though it has appeared in the
course of the argument. The distinction is between that specific social form that we call
political society or (as Maritain prefers) the body politic, on the one hand, and, on the
other, the “state.” In general usage, the term “state” is almost hopelessly ambiguous.
Sometimes, as noted above, “state” refers to the “sovereign,” where the latter is
understood as the government/governor that is above and separate from the governed; at
other times it refers to the government/governor who is above but not separate from the
governed; at still other times it refers not only to the government/governor but also and at
the same time to those who are governed. Maritain proposes to limit the term “state” to
refer to

that part of the body politic especially concerned with the maintenance of
law, the promotion of the common welfare and public order, and the
administration of public affairs. The State is a part which specializes in
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the interests of the whole. It is not a man or a body of men; it is a set of
institutions combined into a topmost machine . . . .40

Maritain, then, limits state to the second of the three usages noted above: the “state” is
above but not separate from political society. The difference is not (as they say) “merely
semantic.” It names the third basic element.

Starting from the basic reality of political society, rather than of a merely
extrinsically aggregated group of individuals known as, say, “the people,” Maritain
observes that those so-constituted govern themselves, and do so through the “state.” The
body politic is not (if you will) acephalous; it has a head, and it is its own head. On
Maritain’s account, the state is not separate from and above political society. The state is,
in effect, that part of themselves that is their servant or instrument. Not some tyrant
above the people (and free to pursue its own interests), but the people’s own creation, it is
duty bound, in virtue of the purpose of its creation, to serve them and the good that is
common to them.

And, since the usual meaning of “sovereign” is to be absolute (which just means,
in its Latin etymology, to be unbound, ab-solutus), the state cannot helpfully be described
as sovereign. It was for this reason (among others) that Maritain counseled us altogether
to abandon the word sovereignty. What the state possesses or embodies is authority – the
legitimate but limited power to rule.
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V. Pluralism and “Subsidiarity”

With this we come to the heart of the matter. The authority that is embodied in
the “state” is just one – though a unique one – among many authorities. Every genuine
society possesses authority. A society without authority is a society on the way out.
Authority is that (topmost) part of a particular society that has the responsibility for the
increase and maintenance of the good of the respective society. To recognize a plurality
of given social forms and the societies that actually instantiate them is, then,
correlatively, to recognize a plurality of authorities: the authority of the father or mother
over the family, the abbot over the abbey, the bishop over the diocese, the Pope over the
Church, and, yes, the Prior of La Grande Chartreuse over the monks and affairs of La
Grande Chartreuse. Furthermore, each of these -- from the remote mountains of the south
of France to the top of Vatican Hill – represents a limitation on would-be sovereigns
everywhere, a limitation on the authority of the state as well as on the respective
authorities of all other societies. The Church, for example, must respect the authority of
family; family must respect the authority of the Church. According to Maritain:

As opposed to the various totalitarian conceptions of political society in
vogue today, the conception here is of a pluralist body politic bringing
together in its organic unity a diversity of social groupings and structures,
each of them embodying positive liberties. . . . Civil society is made up
not only of individuals, but of particular societies formed by them, and a
21

pluralist body politic would allow to these societies the greatest autonomy
possible and would diversify its own internal structure in keeping with
what is typically required by their nature.41

The “pluralist principle” is Maritain’s synonym for what, in the tradition of modern
Catholic social doctrine, usually gets referred to as the principle of subsidiarity.

I am not aware that Maritain ever used the term subsidiarity, and this is, I would
suggest, all to the good. His alternative terminology helps clarify what “subsidiarity,” as
properly understood in the tradition of Catholic social doctrine, is -- and is not -- about.
In common parlance, including about the Maastrict Treaty, one hears that subsidiarity is
the principle that ruling power should devolve to the lowest level at which it can be
exercised effectively.42 In Catholic social doctrine, however, subsidiarity means what
Maritain refers to as the pluralist principle: Plural societies and their respective
authorities must be respected.

In a world in which no natural or supernatural intrinsic unities are given, even in
potency, and in which it is assumed that a sovereign possesses plenary power to parcel
out, it may make a certain sort of sense to resist or limit the sovereign by advancing a
principle according to which he “ought” to allow his power to devolve. Frequently,
including in advertising for the conference for which this paper was prepared, so-called
mediating institutions are justified on the somewhat different ground that they usefully
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check government’s power. Perhaps they do. But in a world in which plural social forms
are given, at least in potency, the putative sovereign’s authority is already and always
limited, and ontologically so. In such a world, subsidiarity means two things. First, it is
a principle of non-absorption; given social forms are to be respected. Second, and
correlative, it is a principle that, when help or assistance flows among such societies, it be
aimed at supporting, not absorbing.43 “As opposed to the various totalitarian conceptions
of political society in vogue today,” Maritain writes, “the conception here is of a pluralist
body politic bringing together in its organic unity a diversity of social groupings and
structures, each of them embodying positive liberties.”44

VI. Church, State, and the Body Politic

All of this, then, is the background, the ontological landscape within which
Maritain comes to the particular problematic we commonly call “Church and state.”
From his understanding of this landscape, Maritain draws three “general immutable
principles” that are to govern that problematic. By attending to these, and also to
Martain’s applications of the same, we can take the measure of what our world might
look like if it were to be differentiated as Maritain envisioned. It is important to
underline that, as Maritain sees the matter, these are not pie-in-the-sky aspirations for
another time and place. Maritain knew the state of the liberty of the Church in our
country; Maritain knew the Everson and McCollum decisions enough to complain about
43
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them.45 Maritain was not daunted; he did not take refuge behind a “thesis” that could not
be achieved. He sought, and exhorted others who would come later, to seek concrete
historical “ideals which are neither absolute nor bound to an unrealizable past, but which
are relative – relative to a given time – and which moreover can be claimed and asserted
as realizable,” 46 and they include the concrete conditions of the true libertas Ecclesiae.

Before getting to Maritain’s three principles, a clarification of context will be in
order. While my emphasis has been on the ontology of social -- rather than substantial -forms, the complete landscape sketched by Maritain includes not only the social but also
the personal ontology, that is, the ontology of human persons each with his or her own
unique, and irreducible< everlasting destiny: “the human person is both part of the body
politic and superior to it through what is supra-temporal, or eternal, in him, in his spiritual
interests and his final destination.”47 The end of the body politic, the temporal common
good, is limited by and subordinated to, inter alia, every single human person’s
ordination, here and now, to a higher end, that is, to God. It is on this basis -- the
individual person’s duty to seek God and worship Him as he finds Him -- that Maritain
bases the individual right to religious freedom.
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For all his celebration of the metaphysical density and calling of every individual
human person, however, Maritain never loses sight of the intrinsic connection between
individual persons and the societies on which their identities and fulfillments depend,
and, above all, that society that is the Church. The state is limited by individuals’
respective natural and supernatural ends; the state is also limited by the Church and her
ends. For the Church to be herself, she must be free, and Maritain is concerned to justify
the liberty of the Church in the eyes both of believers and of non-believers.

What is the Church that she should be free? In the eyes of the unbeliever (who is
not yet “an unbeliever in reason,” Maritain adds), “the Church, or the Churches, are in the
social community particular bodies which must enjoy that right to freedom which is but
one, not only with the right to free association naturally belonging to the human person,
but the right freely to believe the truth recognized by one’s conscience, that is, with the
most basic and inalienable of all human rights.”48 And what is the Church for the
believer? “[T]he Church is a supernatural society, both divine and human – the very type
of perfect or achieved-in-itself, self-sufficient, and independent society – which unites in
itself men as co-citizens of the Kingdom of God and leads them to eternal life, already
begun here below.”49 He continues in language that leaves no room for cultured
misinterpretation:

In such a perspective, not only is the freedom of the Church to be
recognized as required by freedom of association and freedom of religious
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belief without interference from the State, but that freedom of the Church
appears as grounded on the very rights of God and as identical with His
own freedom in the very face of any human institution. The freedom of
the Church does express the very independence of the Incarnate Word.50

The first immutable principle, then, is that the Church must be free to “teach and preach
and worship, the freedom of the Gospel, the freedom of the word of God.”51

The second immutable principle is nothing short of “the superiority of the Church
– that is, of the spiritual – over the body politic or the State.”52 Although the Church is in
a way “in” every body politic, both through the presence there of her members and also
though her institutions, in her “essence” she is “not a part but a whole; she is an
absolutely universal realm stretching all over the world – above the body politic and
every body politic.”53

The third immutable principle follows from the fact that “the same human person
is simultaneously a member of that society which is the Church and a member of that
society which is the body politic. An absolute division between the two of those two
societies would mean that the human person must be cut in two.” Therefore,
“cooperation between the Church and the body politic or the State” is “necessary.”54 In
view of the pluralist principle (or the principle of subsidiarity, properly understood), we
50
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know in advance that help flowing between Church and state, in either or both directions,
must aim at support, not absorption.

Maritain explains (quoting John Courtney Murray) that such cooperation will
entail, first, that the state fulfill its own duties, by implementing the natural law and
securing a workable juridical order.55 It will entail, second, the “public acknowledgment
of the existence of God:” “a political society really and vitally Christian would be
conscious of the doctrine and morality which enlighten for it – that is, for the majority of
the people – the tenets of the democratic charter, and which guide it in putting those
tenets into force.” And finally, Maritain specifies two forms of mutual assistance
between Church and state.

The first and “most basic of them is the recognition and guarantee by the State of
the full freedom of the Church.” Maritain continues, countering the “illusion of modern
times [according to which] mutual freedom means mutual ignorance:” “[T]he fact of
insuring the freedom of somebody is surely an actual, and most actual, though negative,
form of cooperation with him and assistance to him.”56 The second form of mutual
assistance is a positive one, and, according to Maritain, derives first from the body politic
and only derivatively from the state (as the body’s politic’s instrument):

It is . . . by asking the assistance of the Church for its own temporal
common good that the body politic would assist her [the Church] in her

55
56

MS 172, see also 167-68
MS, 177

27

spiritual mission. For the concept of help is not a one-way concept; help
is a two-way traffic. And after all, is it not more normal to have what is
superior, or of greater worth in itself, aiding what is of lesser dignity, than
to have what is terrestrial aiding what is spiritual.”57

What Maritain has in mind is the body politic’s asking and positively facilitating, “within
the framework of laws,” “the religious, social, and educational work by means of which
she – as well as the other spiritual or cultural groups whose helpfulness for the common
good would be recognized by them – freely cooperates in the common welfare.”58
Although in his early work Maritain countenanced the possibility of a privileged juridical
status for the Catholic Church, on his mature view establishment and privilege are ruled
out on account of the conditions for achieving the temporal common good.

Once the political society had been fully differentiated in its secular type,
the fact of inserting into the body politic a particular or partial common
good, the temporal common good of the faithful of one religion (even
though it were the true religion), and of claiming for them, accordingly, a
privileged juridical position in the body politic, would be inserting into the
latter a divisive principle and, to that extent, interfering with the temporal
common good.59
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The resulting situation is one which the Church claims for herself the freedom to be
herself, and, although superior to all other societies, is unwilling and disallowed to make
“institutional, communal claims on the body politic.”60 At liberty to be herself, the
Church is to exercise an indirect, vivifying influence on society (and its institutions).

VII. Conclusion: Society and the Conditions of Its Realization

When the Church reached the judgment that the time had come to differentiate
herself more adequately from the state and the body politic, it was not without awareness
of the risks. The transcendent risk was that she would be reduced, in the eyes of those
with power, to the status of associations that governments would consider themselves
free to allow or not to allow, and, in any event, to regulate for their own purposes.61
There was the risk that the Church would be seen and treated as merely an aggregation of
individuals privately and extrinsically associated, rather than, in virtue of its public
founding by Christ, a truly public society worthy of respect and, perhaps, assistance.62 If,
as Margaret Thatcher asserted, “there is no such thing as society,”63 the Church is in
trouble – as are we all.
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Dame Thatcher did not have the last word. We have recently witnessed a
renewed, though by no means universal, attention to society as a phenomenon of political
significance and moment, not an illusion to be dispelled.64 Especially illuminating, for
present purposes, is the discussion of it by Robert Post and Nancy Rosenblum in their
2002 book Civil Society and Government. “Civil society,” they observe, “is not a residue
on the way to a unified state in which citizenship eclipses other aspects of belonging . . .
Pluralism has a normative as well as a descriptive dimension.”65 So far, so good.
However, there is predictably, and in a way understandably, no recognition that some of
the many particular instantiations of civil society, specifically those of the Church, are
not malleable in the way that others might be. The Boy Scouts can arrange themselves
almost any way they desire. By her own confession, though, the Catholic Church cannot;
for example, it would be ultra vires of the Pope to try to eliminate the distinction between
the laity and the clergy or between priest and bishop66 – no matter the egalitarian
clamorings of civil society, societies aplenty, and legion individuals locked in an
overlapping consensus.

The result of not heeding the dispositive character of given social forms is that the
way is left open, or at least partially open, to government’s creating a “congruence”
between specific moral values of the government and those of particular instantiations or
phases of civil society. As Post and Rosenblum observe, “[t]he ‘logic of congruence’
envisions civil society as reflecting common values and practices ‘all the way down.”67
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Post and Rosenblum presciently mentioned Catholic Charities by name, some two years
before the landmark case of that name was decided by the California Supreme Court.
What was decided there is that, if Catholic Charities of California offers its employees a
health insurance plan, that plan must include contraceptives, despite the Catholic
Church’s judgment that doing so would make her a material cooperator in conduct that
violates the natural and divine moral laws. The argument from “congruence” carried the
day. We would be remiss not to ask how many steps separate such usurpation of the
Church’s self-determination from the requirement for an authorization of the sort the
monks of La Grande Chartreuse were denied.

I suggested at the beginning that the case of the monks of La Grande Chartreuse
is perhaps something approaching the pure case – remote recluses who could pose little
threat to anyone’s earthly projects. But that is perhaps to miss the deeper point. The
monks, though not involved in any active ministry themselves, funded many institutional
works of mercy in the surrounding region, and the beneficiaries and others knew as
much. What is more, the Carthusians’ ancient presence there within the walls of their
cloister -- their venerable witness to the sufficiency of God -- was widely known,
celebrated, and hallowed. For those set against the Church, there would be a special
vexation at the thought or sight of men dedicated to, if you will, nothing more than the
divine service. The revolutionaries and their successors had a particular hatred of the
contemplative orders. The corporal works of mercy and deeds of justice could be
converted, to some extent, to the purposes of egalitarian reformers.68 Not so the divine
praises, however; and it was for this reason, in part, that Pope Pius XI made a hallmark of
68
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his pontificate the celebration of the pure contemplative life. Indeed, he took the
occasion of approving the Carthusians’ required revision of their Statutes (in order to
conform to the 1917 revision of the Code of Canon Law) to issue what has become the
modern papal charter of the contemplative life.69

The Carthusians’ cloistered witness to the Divine Persons is a rebuke to those
who would create paradise on earth.70 It was, then, not without some risk or cost that, in
1941, the monks were finally allowed to return to La Grande Chartreuse. They remain
today, as they had since the time of the Revolution, tenants of the French state that had
not been invented when, in 1084, Hugh, bishop of nearby Grenoble, gave St. Bruno and
his companions a place to call home in the Chartreuse mountain range. The pluralist
principle assigns to the state a role in facilitating the existence and interaction of plural
social forces – not simply to check power, but to respect an ontology that is both from
nature and from supernature. But when we say that these forms are from nature and from
supernature, we do well to recall Bertrand de Jouvenel’s admonition that such
imputations of formal causality, though true, can distract us from the fact that they
depend as well as on the efficient causality that is our own human agency.71 The forms
that come in potency from nature or supernature depend, for their temporal, terrestrial
realization, on our creation of the necessary or desirable social, juridical conditions. In
aid of that, in the world as we know and can foresee it, it would seem that we must write
and interpret constitutions (and other laws) that assist in the realization and augmentation
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of such social forms. It is a further, and not merely speculative, question whether or not
it is possible for us to write a just (and enforceable) constitution that does not recognize,
as some say our United States Constitution does not, the liberty of the Church.72
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